Corporate Governance and Takeover Resistance by Carline, Nicholas F.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Corporate Governance and Takeover Resistance
Carline, Nicholas F.
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Carline, NF 2017, Corporate Governance and Takeover Resistance. in unknown.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Corporate Governance and Takeover Resistance  
 
 
 
Nicholas F. Carline* 
Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TY, U.K. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
I investigate the relation between corporate governance characteristics of hostile takeover targets and the 
choice to employ ‘harmful’ resistance that is not perceived as being motivated by shareholders’ interests. 
I find that harmful resistance is associated with firms where managers have more pronounced ownership-
based and age-related incentives for control, and directors have equity interests less aligned to 
stockholders. These firms also have less independent boards, are exposed to weaker discipline from 
outside blockholders, and are inferior performers. In the presence of harmful resistance, the market is less 
optimistic about the chances of bid completion, and there is a greater likelihood of managerial turnover. 
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Corporate Governance and Takeover Resistance  
 
1. Introduction 
Resistance by the management of a takeover target firm can be perceived to be undertaken in the 
interests of its shareholders, or perceived to be motivated by other considerations, like managerial 
entrenchment behavior, that potentially neglect or negatively impact shareholders’ interests (hereafter 
‘harmful resistance’).1 Apart from the seminal contribution of Dann and DeAngelo (1988), the extensive 
extant literature on hostile takeovers has devoted little attention to the distinction between takeover 
resistance that is ‘adverse’ for shareholders, and resistance that is in shareholder interest.2 In this paper I 
investigate the factors influencing the choice by target managers to employ harmful resistance following 
an unsolicited and rejected takeover bid.   
I empirically investigate the forces driving target company resistance by modeling the managerial 
choice of whether to implement harmful resistance.  The general consensus in the literature is that 
corporate governance can influence company value through an effect on manager choices, although the 
level of the effect is subject to debate (compare for instance Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003, and, 
Cunat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012).  My empirical results show that harmful resistance responses are 
more likely in situations involving weak incentives and weak corporate governance. These results hold 
after accounting for potential endogeneity issues.  Firms in my sample that institute resistance strategies 
that neglect shareholder interests have Chief Executive Officers (C.E.O.s) with more pronounced 
ownership-based and age-related incentives for control, and other directors with equity interests less 
                                                 
1 An example of the latter is the 27 billion euros hostile takeover of Arcelor by Mittal Steel in 2006 – one of the 
largest ever hostile takeover contests in Europe. After a period of staunch shareholder opposition, and in what 
amounted to the overriding tactic in Arcelor’s bid defence against Mittal Steel, Arcelor finally agreed to acquire a 
large stake in a steel producer Severstal that would give rise to a merger and also allow its top directors to continue 
to remain in office. See the Financial Times throughout May and June 2006 for a comprehensive commentary on the 
Arcelor/Mittal Steel takeover contest, especially the reports on May 26, 2006 and June 26, 2006. 
 
2 Becht, Bolton and Roell (2005, pg. 16), in an extensive survey of the literature, say: “Little or no work to date has 
been devoted to the question of identifying which actions or investments constitute ‘entrenchment behavior’ and 
which do not.”   
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closely aligned to stockholders.  Firms that follow such strategies have less independent boards, are 
exposed to weaker discipline from active outside blockholders, and are inferior performers.   
I also show that such actions do not go unnoticed by the capital market.  In new results to the 
literature, I find the capital market-wide assessment of the probability the bid will be successful is 
significantly smaller for bids accompanied by harmful resistance. Finally, using the choice to engage in 
harmful resistance as a potential indicator of a more deep-seated managerial agency problem, I also find 
that harmful resistance is associated with post-bid consequences for target C.E.O.s.  I specifically find 
that an increased likelihood of subsequent C.E.O. turnover is associated with a bid in which target 
managers engage in harmful resistance. However, while C.E.O. turnover can be more frequent following 
such events, I find that the longer-term employment opportunities of target C.E.O.s, including subsequent 
executive positions as well as director positions, are not directly affected any more than for other resisting 
firms. My evidence does show however that the effect of C.E.O. turnover per se is associated with smaller 
likelihood of longer-term post-bid employment opportunities. 
Classifying resistance as either harmful or otherwise must ultimately involve assessing how the 
capital market views such resistance.  The criteria I use to identify harmful resistance relies both on 
previously documented results on specific defensive resistance actions, as well as capital market price 
change indicators at the time the resistance is announced. The former criterion is specifically motivated 
by Dann and DeAngelo (1988) in that I too include all defensive asset restructuring and other blocking 
tactics that are prima-facie suggestive ex-ante of managerial entrenchment, or at least actions not overtly 
or necessarily motivated by shareholder interests.  For the latter criterion, I specifically consider whether 
the target company’s share price reacts negatively to announcement of the resistance, an indicator I take 
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as not being in the best overall interest of shareholders.  Such cases could include actions driven by a 
managerial entrenchment motive as well as managerial neglect of the ‘duty of loyalty’.3  
Research examining takeover resistance has generally aggregated all forms of resistance together 
or focused on a specific type of resistance tactic (see Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2010, for a recent 
survey of the literature on corporate takeovers.) Examples include the adoption of poison pills or anti-
takeover provisions (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Linn and McConnell, 1983; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987; 
Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994; 
Comment and Schwert, 1995; Heron and Lie, 2006), the use of defensive cash payouts (Denis, 1990; 
Heron and Lie, 2006), and the use of staggered boards (Bebchuk, Coates IV and Subramanian, 2002; 
Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007).    In contrast my interest is in disaggregating resistance choices 
into those that adversely affect shareholders and those that do not.  In this way, this paper follows Dann 
and DeAngelo (1988), who examine a multiplicity of takeover responses by target managers.  My study 
differs in that I relate the choices made to the internal and external governance characteristics of the target 
firms involved, and investigate how markets interpret and use information about these choices.  
Unsolicited takeover bids play an important role in the market for corporate control.  Ex-ante, the 
threat of a takeover bid represents an external control mechanism serving in principle to motivate 
managers to operate the firm they oversee efficiently (Fama and Jensen, 1983).   Ex-post, successful bids 
serve to reallocate corporate resources to their highest valued use and provide a means for disciplining 
errant or incompetent managers.  The ex-ante threat of takeover however can be influenced by target 
managements’ ability to thwart the offer once it is made.  A positive market response to takeover 
resistance has generally been interpreted as evidence of resistance acting to enhance shareholder wealth 
via a better bargaining position and the ability to extract a high premium (Schwert, 2000; Bates and 
Becher, 2016).  On the other hand a negative reaction has been interpreted as evidence of managers 
                                                 
3 “The duty of loyalty requires directors and officers to act in good faith, to act in the best interests of the corporation 
and its stockholders, and to refrain from receiving improper personal benefits as a result of their relationship with 
the corporation.” (Forrester and Ferber, 2012, at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/RRDonnelley-2012-
Fiduciary-Duties.pdf).  And similarly as pertains to the U.K., see Part 10, Section 172 of the Companies Act 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents).   
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seeking to cement their entrenchment and extend their private benefits of control (Huang and Walkling, 
1987; Cotter and Zenner, 1994).   
Target management actions designed to thwart an offer with the intent of entrenching 
management and/or preserving the inefficient use of corporate resources are at odds with maximizing 
shareholder wealth (Schwert, 2000; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005).  Alternatively, bid resistance by target 
management can represent a strategic maneuver designed to maximize the price offered to target 
shareholders (Stulz, 1988; Berkovitch, Bradley and Khanna, 1989; Berkovitch and Khanna, 1990; 
Schwert, 2000).  The choice of how an unsolicited takeover bid is resisted therefore has both important 
economic implications as well as potential links to the incentives and pressures faced by target managers, 
in particular those established by the corporate governance umbrella covering the target firm.  In this 
study I ask and answer the following question:  conditional on an unsolicited offer being rejected by a 
target firm, what determines whether resistance is driven by motives based on shareholder interest; or is 
driven by considerations like managerial self-interest that neglect, or are adverse to, the interests of 
shareholders?  The U.K. takeover market provides a natural setting for the empirical investigation because 
U.S.-style, pre-emptive, anti-takeover mechanisms are absent, and thus do not contaminate managerial 
resistance in direct response to an unsolicited bid. My results emphasize the relation between the internal 
and external corporate governance characteristics of targets in unsolicited offers that actively resist, the 
types of resistance choices selected by target managers, and the implications of those choices.   
How managers respond to bids is an important economic factor influencing both the payoffs to 
target stockholders as well as the distribution of corporate resources (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter, 1988; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001).  The debate over the efficacy of 
takeover resistance is by no means settled and has led some to propose that resistance should be forbidden 
(Bebchuk, 2002).  Explanations for why managers resist takeover bids are typically couched in terms of 
stockholder interest motives or managerial self-interest.  The ‘stockholder interest’ hypothesis proposes 
that managers resist bids because they have superior information about the true value of the firms under 
their control and seek to extract a takeover premium for target stockholders reflecting this valuation 
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(Franks and Mayer, 1996; Schwert, 2000).  Resistance motivated by stockholder interests would therefore 
involve strategies that increase information about company fundamentals and any value gap, and/or that 
would incite competing bids.  The opposing hypothesis states that target company managers resist bids to 
deliberately avoid the potential personal consequences of the firm being taken over.  Such consequences 
might include the loss of any private benefits of control, including any non-tangible utility that comes 
from overseeing a large organization and any labor market discipline that might follow a successful 
takeover (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).   For these reasons my main focus is on unsolicited offers 
that are in fact resisted. 
Resistance by target management is often associated with the notion of the offer being viewed as 
hostile.  Schwert (2000) finds that a commonly used measure of hostility, as identified by the commercial 
vendor Securities Data Corporation (S.D.C.), does not lead to the conclusion that the valuation impacts of 
hostile versus friendly offers are different.  Furthermore, he finds that strategic bargaining, rather than 
non-value maximizing behaviour by target management, is the motivation for hostility. Schwert (2000) 
concludes that bid resistance is a bargaining tool that is used by target management to improve the terms 
of the takeover for their shareholders.  Schwert (2000) treats all hostile offers as a single group whereas in 
my study, as mentioned earlier, I identify resisting targets on the basis of whether or not they engage in 
harmful resistance that is not motivated by shareholder interest. Aside from Dann and DeAngelo (1988), 
studies of takeover resistance have not discriminated between resistance motivated by managerial self-
interest and resistance motivated by shareholder interests.  My study makes such a distinction allowing 
me to draw new empirical conclusions about the determinants and effects of harmful versus other bona 
fide resistance.  Contemporaneous research by Bates, and Becher (2016) also focuses on takeover 
resistance.  In contrast to their study I specifically differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ resistance, and 
the determinants and implications of the type of resistance chosen by target managers.  In this way I add 
an alternative perspective on takeover resistance that has largely gone unaddressed in the literature. 
In addition to the above, this research also contributes to the segment of the literature focusing 
generally on the impact of managerial entrenchment or malfeasance on mergers and takeovers.  The 
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conclusion of this branch of the literature has been that managerial entrenchment is associated with bad 
acquisitions (Jensen, 1986; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 
2012).4  While this literature has tended to focus on bidder decisions, my contribution is on the other side, 
focusing instead on the question of how managerial self-interest or entrenchment influences the choices 
made by targets when faced with a takeover bid.   
Section 2 describes my sample and how I classify target firms in terms of resistance choice. 
Section 3 describes predictions and the variables I examine. Section 4 reports and discusses results on the 
relations between the variables described in Section 3 and target company resistance choice.   Section 5 
examines the relation between the capital market’s assessment of the probability of success and 
managerial resistance choice.  Section 6 reports on C.E.O. post-bid turnover and longer-term employment 
opportunities of target company C.E.O. s.  Section 7 presents my conclusions.   
 
2. The sample 
2.1 Sample identification 
My empirical investigation is based on the U.K., which provides a natural setting for focusing on 
target resistance activities following an offer because the ex-ante structural takeover defenses mentioned 
earlier that potentially deter takeovers are absent. A distinguishing feature of the U.K. market for 
corporate control is that the regulatory environment in the U.K. effectively shields stockholders from U.S. 
style shark repellents or poison pills.5 This is an important institutional feature in the context of my 
                                                 
4 Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) and Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2012) take the Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003)  index as an ex-ante proxy for governance where weak governance implies a form of entrenchment 
and test whether the index  is associated with bad acquisition choices.  Such an index, even if it is a reliable way of 
capturing entrenchment, is less applicable in the U.K. because the regulatory setting has always protected 
stockholders from anti-takeover provisions of one kind or another.   
5 See Rule 21 of The Takeover Code, available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-code/download-code. 
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research question, since it allows me to focus on direct responses to an offer in a setting in which ex-ante 
anti-takeover devices are absent, and thus do not contaminate my investigation of resistance.6   
My sample is drawn from the population of unsolicited takeover bids for U.K. firms during the 
period 07/1989-12/2003. I selected this sample period for three primary reasons.  First, there was limited 
disclosure of corporate governance structures pre-1989 in the U.K..  Second, for the part of my analysis 
dealing with the potentially disciplinary consequences of bid resistance, I need to track the aftermarket 
employment opportunities of target C.E.O.s for up to 3 years beyond the completion of the bid. Third, 
there were relatively few unsolicited bids immediately preceding and during the global financial crisis. 
The initial sample is identified from Acquisitions Monthly and the S.D.C. Platinum Mergers and 
Acquisition Database and includes completed as well as failed unsolicited takeover bids.  I exclude 
takeover targets that are not publicly traded or are traded in the alternative investment market, those 
operating in the financial/real estate industry and those operating in heavily regulated industries, 
specifically the utility/telecommunication, public transport, broadcasting, and newspaper industries.   
The latter half (1997-2003) of my sample period was associated with a shift to a more stringent 
corporate governance regime in the U.K. including increased emphasis on board independence from top 
management.   In particular the 1997-2003 period saw the publication of the “Combined Code: Principles 
of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice” in 1998 and refinements to the Code, along with the 
implementation of disclosure requirements on compliance with the Code imposed by the London Stock 
Exchange (refer to: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf).  The fraction of unsolicited 
offers during 1989-1996 was roughly 18.3% of the total offers for that period while the number was 
10.2% for the period 1997-2003.  One explanation for the decline in the proportion of unsolicited offers is 
that the increased attention to stockholder interests due to the shift in governance emphasis may have 
                                                 
6 See Stout (2002) for a discussion of the potential ex-ante benefits of anti-takeover provisions.  Aside from Rule 21, 
the Companies Act provides that investors in U.K. companies are also entitled to call for an Extraordinary General 
Meeting if the shareholders calling for this meeting hold 10% or more of the voting shares.  At such a meeting those 
shareholders may put forward resolutions to appoint and/or remove directors. In other words, even though most 
directors in the U.K. are only put up for election once every 3 years (staggered board), a would-be acquiring 
company – provided it has sufficient shareholder support – can oust the management of a U.K. listed company in a 
relatively short space of time. 
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resulted in a greater willingness on the part of management to negotiate friendly deals consistent with the 
finding in Bange and Mazzeo (2004) that more independent boards are more likely to negotiate.  While I 
do not emphasize these results, consistent with the presence of a time effect I observe significantly higher 
percentages of independent directors and outside blockholdings during the 1997-2003 period for my 
sample together with a greater incidence of bidders approaching targets prior to the bid and harmful 
resistance. As such I control for this time effect in the analyses that follow.    
2.2 Resistance identification and classification  
I identify resistance activities implemented by target companies by reading the full text of every 
offer-related announcement filed with the Regulatory News Service (R.N.S.) of the London Stock 
Exchange (L.S.E.) for each bid in the sample.  I define a publicly resisted (rejected) bid as the first 
takeover attempt of a target firm to be formally initiated and then rejected within a period of at least 1 
year.  I account for all subsequent offers, including those from third parties, officially announced up to 1 
year after the resolution of the first bid.  The final sample includes 121 publicly resisted takeover bids for 
119 unique target firms. The only target firms appearing twice had sample bids separated by at least 2 
years.   The sample therefore includes only unsolicited offers that are resisted, and, as such, the results I 
present are conditional on both the joint observation of an unsolicited bid, and resistance to that bid by the 
target, allowing me to focus on the motives for resistance. To the extent that I are unable to account for 
any firms that might otherwise have resorted to harmful resistance had they not either been immune to 
takeover bids or been able to negotiate acceptable offer terms, my results will be biased against finding 
any association between corporate governance and takeover resistance. That would also be the case for 
any firms that might otherwise have engaged in bona fide resistance had they not been able to negotiate 
acceptable offer terms. 
Arguably, certain specific types of defensive restructuring resistance actions are prima-facie 
suggestive ex-ante of managerial entrenchment, or at least actions not overtly or necessarily motivated by 
shareholder interests. These include: (1) Spin-offs/sell-offs which are divestments that deny bidders 
access to assets of value, (2) Mergers/acquisitions/joint ventures which make target firms more 
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cumbersome to acquire due to size, strategic, or antitrust grounds, or, which eliminate bidders directly, (3) 
Stock repurchases/special dividends which involve payouts that eliminate a bidder’s access to excess cash 
held by the target, and, in the case of targeted repurchases, that increase the proportion of stock in the 
hands of friendly (to management) stockholders, (4) Going private transactions which use competing 
management buyouts to create bidding contests, potentially reducing bidder expected gains, (5) 
Management changes which make removal of newly appointed officers especially costly because of 
special contractual payments triggered by a takeover, and (6) The enlistment of friendly third party 
participants who acquire stakes that will effectively block the takeover leaving the extant management 
team in control.7  Dann and DeAngelo (1988), in a study of resisted U.S. takeover contests, show 
empirically that share prices fall, on average, in response to the above-listed types of defensive 
restructuring resistance activities, and conclude that such activities are evidence of managers seeking to 
cement their entrenchment. On the other hand, resistance actions that, for example, resolve information 
asymmetry by enhancing the availability of value relevant information about the higher true worth of 
target firms (relative to the bid), strengthen the relative bargaining positions of shareholders during the 
course of takeover bids, and are in the interests of shareholders.8 
I use the six specific types of defensive restructuring resistance actions listed above as my starting 
point for classifying cases in my sample that represent harmful resistance. I then identify those cases in 
this subgroup for which there was a negative abnormal stock price reaction associated with the resistance 
announcement. I use market adjusted daily returns to estimate the reactions where the market proxy is the 
F.T.S.E. All Share Index.  My reliance on the negative capital market reaction to the resistance 
announcement provides a market-driven classification method based upon how shareholders greeted the 
resistance, given that a negative reaction would in general be inconsistent with the action being perceived 
                                                 
7 The potential ramifications of many of these activities are reviewed in the extensive survey of Betton, Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2010). 
8 Examples are releasing new financial and strategic information measures to aid in justifying and communicating 
higher target firm valuations, lobbying significant stockholders, and soliciting third party takeover attempts. 
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as in the best interests of shareholders.9  There are fifty cases in the harmful resistance group so 
identified, 41% of the total sample of 121 unsolicited and resisted offers. If the classification system I 
employ is excessively noisy it should reduce the power of the tests I report to reject the null.   
Frequencies of the specific resistance tactics employed by the 50 targets in the harmful resistance 
group are presented in Table 1. Spin-offs/sell-offs are the most commonly employed measures, with 
defensive divestment proposals being used by 46% of the firms in the focus group.  
Mergers/acquisitions/joint ventures are used in 30% of the cases, and 16% employ stock repurchases/ 
special dividends.  Going private transactions, management changes, and the use of white squires are used 
less frequently, in 10%, 10% and 8% of the cases respectively.  On average, 1.2 different tactics are used 
by target boards in the harmful resistance group. The proportion of targets using spin-offs/sell-offs drops 
from roughly 58 % during the 1989-1996 period to 35% during the 1997-2003 period.  In contrast, there 
is nearly a trebling in the percentage using stock repurchases/special dividends. Table 1 also displays the 
average abnormal returns for each tactic group at the time the action is announced.  I report averages only 
for brevity, but emphasize, as is displayed in column 3 of the table, that the percentage of cases with a 
negative reaction is equal to 100% for each category. 
Roughly 15% of all 121 targets in the sample engaged in asset restructuring prior to a bid and 
roughly 21% had management changes.  The fractions did not however differ between the first and 
second halves of the sample period (1989-1996 and 1997-2003) (Z-statistics for differences in 
proportions: 0.15 (asset restructuring) and 0.06 (management changes)).  These results suggest the 
resistance strategies used by the sample firms were not likely the result of changes in the tendencies of 
boards to implement such strategies prior to a bid. 
Thirty four percent (34%) of the target boards (out of 121) directly solicit third party bids.  The 
fraction is significantly higher (abs. Z-statistic: 2.91) during the latter half of the sample period (49% 
versus 24%). Thirty nine percent (39%) of these cases involve members of the harmful resistance group 
                                                 
9 That said, for my sample, the overwhelming majority of cases - almost all - falling within the ambit of the six 
defensive resistance strategies listed above as having the potential to be adverse to shareholder interests, display 
resistance-announcement related negative abnormal returns. 
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and as such represent defenses of last resort (or ‘white knights’) as distinct from the remaining cases of 
pure bidder solicitation. Furthermore, where a ‘white knight’ ends up acquiring the target, the C.E.O. 
remains in place 50% of the time compared to only 28% for cases of pure bidder solicitation.  Twenty 
four percent (24%) of the sample firms issued higher (defined as at least 10%) profit announcements 
when opposing takeover offers. This proportion declined significantly (absolute Z-statistic: 2.20) between 
the first and second halves of the sample period (14% versus 31%).   Twenty four percent (24%) of these 
cases involve members of the harmful resistance group indicating that these actions, in contrast to those 
defining that group, are more consistent with target managers seeking improved payoffs for shareholders. 
 
3. Predictions and variable measurement 
 
3.1 Internal and external incentives and governance and resistance choice 
A target’s choice to resist may be influenced by the internal and/or external governance 
conditions it faces at the time of the bid.  For instance Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) develop a 
theoretical model in which target managers’ underlying motivation is shareholder wealth maximization 
but in which defensive strategies arise and are optimal.  However, the authors also conclude that 
resistance strategies can lead to negative revaluations of the target.  This can occur when managers use 
resistance to entrench their positions.  The effect is compounded when the effectiveness of managerial 
monitoring by shareholders is weak (Berkovitch and Khanna, 1990, section III.B.).  Mechanisms that may 
link shareholder and manager interests include such things as the alignment of manager wealth and 
income with stockholder wealth, the configuration of the board of directors, and the presence of investors 
who hold large blocks of shares giving them the potential to influence manager actions.   
Some empirical evidence suggests target boards are less inclined to resist bids per se the greater 
are the potential net wealth gains for target managers in the event of a takeover (Walkling and Long, 
1984; Cotter and Zenner, 1994).  Cotter and Zenner (1994) conclude that the fraction and value of 
managerial ownership is the driving force and that these personal wealth effects exceed the present value 
of lost compensation resulting from dismissal following a successful takeover.  Demsetz (1983), Fama 
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and Jensen (1983), Stulz (1988) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) have argued that large 
managerial ownership stakes can give rise to managers extracting greater private benefits of control if 
those stakes allow them to maintain control.  If the personal benefits to managers from entrenchment 
outweigh the losses they incur from not pursuing shareholder wealth maximization then there is an 
incentive for them to seek to maintain the status quo.  Larger ownership stakes could therefore promote 
resistance for entrenchment reasons and might in fact be selected strategically by target managers.  I use 
the percentage of outstanding stock held beneficially by the C.E.O. of the target company to test for the 
presence of these effects. Information on ownership stakes for my sample companies along with the 
additional variables described in this section and those that follow are obtained from several sources: 
Companies House filings, the Corporate Register, the R.N.S. and Datastream.10 
Holmström (1982) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) argue that agency problems worsen as 
managers approach retirement and begin to care less about their long-term career prospects. This suggests 
that a positive relation may exist between C.E.O. age and resistance driven by managerial self-interest.  In 
the same vein, Dechow and Sloan (1991), Antia, Pantzalis, and Park (2010) and Serfling (2014) provide 
evidence that older managers focus excessively on actions with short-term gains.  Jenter and Lewellen 
(2015) provide evidence that C.E.O.s closer to retirement are more willing to accept takeovers at lower 
premiums, that is they may be less prone to resist.  Taken together I capture these effects by 
hypothesizing and testing the proposition that C.E.O. age is non-linearly related to resistance with age 
becoming a less important factor as retirement age is approached.  I capture this effect using C.E.O. age 
and its square. 
Gillan (2006) refers to the board of directors as “… the lynchpin of corporate governance” (p. 
385).  This view stems from the fiduciary obligation of the board to shareholders, and the board’s 
principal role of monitoring and disciplining management (see for instance, Bhagat and Black, 1999, 
                                                 
10 All U.K. registered companies have always been required to deposit a copy of their annual report and accounts, 
and other director and stockholder related filings, with Companies House.  The Corporate Register has been 
published at least bi-annually since 1989 and provides a means of tracking executive and director positions across 
U.K. listed companies.  The R.N.S. has always collated all material news in an as disclosed form from listed 
companies to the L.S.E..  Stock prices and returns and financial data are sourced from Datastream.      
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2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  The beneficial ownership of directors other than the C.E.O. has 
the potential to enhance director incentives to monitor managerial behavior.  At the same time, directors 
other than the C.E.O are less likely to enjoy private benefits of control. Boards that are aligned with 
shareholder interests may in principle seek to keep harmful resistance actions of managers in check.  
Under such conditions I would expect that more aligned boards would be less likely to support harmful 
resistance.  The percentage of the outstanding equity shares beneficially held by directors other than the 
C.E.O. is my measure of the direct alignment between those board members and stockholders. 
Directors may also be more prone to serve the interests of stockholders if the board is sufficiently 
independent of the C.E.O.  Directors are broadly deemed to be autonomous when no discernible personal, 
employment, or business connections to the firms on whose boards they reside exist nor to the managers 
of those firms.  Directors who serve on the boards of more than one firm have added incentives to act as 
good stewards because this contributes to the building up of their reputation capital in the market for 
directors.  One force potentially driving independent directors to act in the interest of shareholders is the 
value of their reputation in the director labor market (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993, in the 
specific context of takeovers).  I construct two alternative measures of target board independence.  The 
first measure is based on board composition and equals the percentage of the board members who are 
outsiders and also hold at least one, non-interlocking, directorship at another firm.  A non-interlocking 
directorship is defined as one in which the non-aligned director can serve as a C.E.O., but on whose board 
the target C.E.O. does not reside.11  My second measure is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if an 
outside director holding at least one, non-interlocking, directorship at another firm is also chair of the 
board and 0 otherwise.  If independent boards act in shareholder interests I expect the more independent 
are resisting target boards the less likely they are predicted to engage in harmful opposition tactics.   
Another important characteristic of the board that may play a role in board decision-making is the 
number of board members.  Yermack (1996) has shown that large boards tend to be associated with lower 
                                                 
11 In which the eligible companies in question are members of a non-regulated industry (not in the financial/real 
estate, utility/telecommunication, public transport, broadcasting, and newspaper industries) and have a full listing on 
the L.S.E.. 
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firm valuations.  Jensen (1993) argues that boards containing more than 8 members function less 
effectively and are easier for the C.E.O. to control.  In contrast Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) suggest 
a non-linear relation exists between board size and value.  I measure the size of the board using the 
number of target firm directors. 
Outside blockholders can potentially play an active role in corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986) and can facilitate hostile takeover bids (Shivdasani, 1993).  Target managers’ responses to an 
unsolicited bid may be influenced by the pressure brought to bear on them by outside blockholders.  I 
define a non-aligned blockholding as a blockholding of at least 5% of total equity votes, over which 
managers do not exercise control and that is not held by any target director.  I use total shares held by 
such blockholders as a percentage of all shares to measure aggregate blockholder influence.  Initial bidder 
toehold interests are excluded from the measure of blockholder ownership.   
All data on governance related variables are measured as close as possible to, but before the bid 
date.   
3.2 Other factors     
Franks and Mayer (1996) and Schwert (2000), among others, find that unsolicited offers are not 
necessarily directed at only inefficiently managed firms.  However, the managers of inefficiently 
managed target firms may stand to lose more (jobs, reputations, private benefits of control, etc.) than their 
counterparts at firms that are efficiently managed as a result of a successful takeover.  If true such 
managers are predicted to engage in entrenchment motivated resistance.  I measure company efficiency 
using the pre-bid market to book value of the target firm and the target’s asset turnover ratio both for up 
to 2 years ending at the fiscal year-end prior to the bid. Market value of assets is computed as the 
common stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares, plus the book value of non-equity 
securities and total debt.  The stock price is measured 30 days prior to the bid or prior to any official 
rumor period, whichever is longer. The book value of tangible assets (total assets minus intangibles) is 
used as the denominator for both performance measures.        
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The cost of acquiring information about target firms has been inversely linked to managers’ 
decisions to resist takeover bids (Fishman, 1988, for a theoretical justification and Jennings and Mazzeo, 
1993, for empirical evidence).  Managers of target firms with relatively more publicly available 
information who choose to resist are likely not motivated by a desire to increase the information set 
available about their firm.  My proxy for information availability is based upon firm age.  I define firms 
with less information as those whose shares have been fully listed for 6 years or less (Jennings and 
Mazzeo, 1993).  A binary variable labeled ‘Young firm’ is used to identify such cases.  The natural 
logarithm of firm size proxied by pseudo market value (as previously defined) is has been  employed by 
numerous authors including Mikkelson and Partch (1989), Cotter and Zenner (1994), and Schwert (2000). 
The offer premium reveals in part the bidder’s beliefs about the value creation potential of 
acquiring the target as well as the likelihood that the offer will be met with resistance.  In the takeover 
models of Giammarino and Heinkel (1986), Fishman (1988) and Hirshleifer and Png (1989) for instance a 
large offer premium reveals a high bidder valuation of the target.   Inefficiently managed targets present 
an opportunity for value creation that may include reorganization and dismissal of the target’s top 
management team as first proposed by Manne (1965).  A larger premium may thus be viewed by the 
inefficient manager as an indicator that if the takeover is successful dismissal may be likely and thus lead 
to harmful resistance.  In contrast, managers who are motivated by stockholder wealth interests (efficient 
managers) will resort to resistance to improve the terms of what they view as inferior bids. Initial bid 
premiums have been associated with the likelihood of resistance, with lower premiums, on average, being 
rejected at a greater rate (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993). However, such studies do not directly consider 
what I refer to as harmful resistance.  Initial bid premiums are computed as the percentage difference 
between the offer price and the target firm’s stock price, adjusted for the effects of takeover rumor.12  
                                                 
12 For the case of offers involving an exchange of common stock, the bidder’s stock price is taken 5 trading days 
before the bid announcement date.  The bid rumor adjustment is similar to that described for the target firm’s market 
value of assets. Bates and Becher (2016) primarily focus on an abnormal premium (actual minus predicted 
premium).  When I compute predicted premiums in a similar manner from within my sample and include the 
abnormal premium in place of the actual premium the results to follow are unchanged.     
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Bidder toe-holds have been shown to be an important element in takeovers and to exhibit both 
variation across bidders as well as the observation that many bidders hold smaller pre-bid share positions 
than the maximally legal ownership level (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993; Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Betton, 
Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009).  Goldman and Qian (2005) develop a model in which optimal toehold 
positions account for post-bid target value if an offer fails due to resistance, and show toehold positions 
are endogenous in the model.  This occurs within a setting in which the motive for target resistance is to 
preserve target managers’ private benefits of control and the ex-ante probability of takeover is increasing 
in the bidder toehold. Betton Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) conclude that if the target management is 
expected to resist regardless of the size of the toehold, then acquiring a toehold is always optimal.  This 
also suggests the toehold may be endogenous.  Walking (1985), Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) and Betton 
and Eckbo (2000) find that toehold bidding increases the probability of takeover success.  Managers that 
choose to resist takeover bids will find it increasingly difficult to do so for entrenchment reasons the 
greater is the voting power behind these toehold interests.  I measure toeholds as the percentage of total 
equity votes controlled by initial bidders immediately prior to the announcement of the offer.  As an 
alternative proxy for the bargaining power of initial bidders an indicator variable is used to identify cases 
where either the bidder already has a representative on the target board, or a dissident target director 
pledges support for the bidder. 
Resistance may also be related to the terms of the offer and to whether the bidder makes a 
genuine approach to the target’s board before launching the bid.  For instance, the model developed by 
Fishman (1988) suggests that cash bids are more likely to be accepted.  Bids for cash have been weakly 
associated with less bid resistance (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993), while bidder approach has been strongly 
connected to a lower propensity for opposition (St-Pierre, Gagnon and Saint-Pierre, 1996). ‘Full cash 
terms’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the initial bid is a cash offer and 0 otherwise.  
‘Bidder approach’ is an indicator variable used to identify cases where the initial bidder makes an 
approach to the target board before launching their bid.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the target firms.  Data are presented for the harmful 
resistance group and for all other resisting targets.    C.E.O.s of target firms classified in the harmful 
resistance group own an unconditional mean beneficial equity interest of 2.30% of their firms’ stock, 
although the median stake is considerably less at only 0.09%.  In contrast mean C.E.O. holdings for the 
remaining targets equals 1.47%.  The unconditional means (and medians) of the two groups are not 
significantly different using a mean difference t-test or the Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of medians.  
The average and median age of a C.E.O. in the sample is 52 years.  The difference in the unconditional 
means (medians) of C.E.O. age between the two groups is not significant. 
Directors of target firms in the harmful resistance group, excluding C.E.O.s, have a mean and 
median personal stock interest of 1.24% and 0.30%, respectively.  In contrast director ownership for the 
remaining targets is larger: mean 2.89%, median 0.44%.   However conventional tests indicate neither the 
unconditional means nor medians are statistically different between the groups.  C.E.O. and other director 
equity stakes do however exhibit cross-sectional variation (harmful resistance group: 6.3% and 2.5%; all 
other targets: 4.1% and 8.2%).   
Targets in which the C.E.O. and board chair positions are separated and where the board chair is 
also an independent director are observed less frequently for firms in the harmful resistance group (20% 
versus 45%) and the difference in the proportions is statistically significant.  Independent directors 
constitute roughly 17% of the board for the harmful resistance group and about 19% for all other targets. 
The mean (and median) number of directors is roughly the same for both the harmful resistance group and 
all others and equals 7 members.  Outside blockholdings are statistically significantly smaller for the 
harmful resistance group (25% versus 32%) and this is true for both the means and the medians. 
The mean (median) offer premiums are not statistically different between the two groups.  This is 
also true for the fraction of the target’s shares held as a toehold, for the fraction of cases in which a 
dissident director sympathetic to the bidder was present, for the fraction of cases in which a full cash offer 
was made, and whether the bidder approached the target prior to the bid. 
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Average and median statistics for the company performance proxies reveal that, for the 2 year 
period preceding the initial takeover bids, non-harmful resisting firms have market to book value ratios in 
excess of the harmful resistance group and have asset turnover ratios that are also larger.  But these 
differences are not statistically different from zero.   The non-harmful resistance group is made up of 
younger firms (those that have been fully listed 6 years or less) and the difference in the fractions of 
younger firms in both groups is statistically significant.     
There is a 1.6 fold increase between the periods 1989-1996 and 1997-2003 in the mean number of 
independent directors on the boards of resisting targets.  This result is consistent with the overall structure 
of U.K. boards having changed significantly in response to numerous independent reports on corporate 
governance practices and the publication of the “Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and 
Code of Best Practice”.  This finding also potentially explains my earlier observation that a relatively 
smaller percentage of takeover offers are unsolicited during the period 1997-2003.  That is, a greater 
degree of board independence may have eased the path for would-be acquirers to privately negotiate deals 
with incumbent directors.  I also find that the incidence of bidders approaching targets before a bid 
increased from 19% to 43% between the sub-periods although curiously a greater fraction of such 
approaches is observed for cases involving targets that ultimately follow harmful resistance strategies.  
This latter result is perhaps consistent with bidders seeking out firms that are not performing as well only 
to be dismissed by target management.  Taken together these observations are consistent in spirit to those 
of Boone and Mulherin (2007) who find a takeover market in the 1990s that is increasingly characterized 
by pre-public negotiation.  
 
4. Resistance, managerial incentives and corporate governance 
 Table 3 presents the average marginal effects of variables selected to represent the hypotheses 
described in Section 3 on the probability of choosing a value decreasing resistance strategy (harmful 
resistance).  I model the choice variable as a probit specification.  Similar results (not tabulated) are found 
for logit specifications.  Marginal effects in probit (or logit) models are related to all of the estimated 
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coefficients of the model and hence examining the estimated coefficients by themselves can lead to 
potential misinterpretations (Woolridge, 2002; Long and Freese, 2006).   Following convention, marginal 
effects for binary explanatory variables are measured as the difference in the evaluated probability when 
the variable takes the value 1 minus the value when it equals 0.  The dependent variable takes the value 1 
for each of the 50 cases I classify as being associated with value decreasing resistance and 0 otherwise.    
As already mentioned, my results are conditional on the bid being unsolicited and being resisted.  For 
convenience I refer later to the ‘probability’ of harmful resistance resistance but it should be understood 
that what I are speaking of is conditional on the bid being unsolicited and resisted.   
It is possible that one or more of the right hand side variables in the model are endogenous.   
Specifically the explanatory variables offer premium and bidder toehold might potentially be endogenous 
(Fishman, 1988; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner, 1997; Bange and Mazzeo, 
2004; Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009).  Likewise, C.E.O. and outside blockholder ownership might 
also reflect strategic choices by managers and investors that could be related to benefits of control and 
hence to the choice of resistance.  In the discussion that follows I comment on the results of tests for 
exogeneity for each of these variables.  I do not present all the results for brevity but in Table 3 do include 
the results for models that treat the offer premium as potentially endogenous.  I present two sets of results 
in Table 3.  In one set of results the offer premium is treated as an exogenous variable by assumption.  In 
the second set of results I treat the offer premium as if it is potentially endogenous and test the null 
hypothesis that the variable is exogenous using a Wald test (Woolridge, 2002).  
Columns labeled ‘Probit’ in Table 3 report average marginal effects for each explanatory variable 
in the model treating the offer premium as exogenous by assumption.  Z-test statistics for the null 
hypothesis that the marginal effects equal zero are reported in parentheses.  A marginal effect measures 
the partial of the expected probability of the choice to select a value decreasing resistance tactic with 
respect to an explanatory variable. The average marginal effect is computed by evaluating the marginal 
effects at every observation and then averaging (Woolridge, 2002).  Columns labeled ‘2-stage’ report 
average marginal effects for models in which the offer premium is treated as an endogenous variable.  
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The modeling assumption is that the choice variable is described by a probit model while the continuous 
endogenous variable is described by a linear model with normally distributed errors.13  These models are 
estimated using maximum likelihood methods (Woolridge, 2002). Wald test statistics of the null 
hypothesis that the variable labeled ‘offer premium’ is exogenous are reported at the bottom of each 
column labeled 2-stage.14  In every case I cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the offer 
premium (p-values for the test all exceed 0.05 by a healthy margin).  The resulting estimated coefficients 
for all other variables are of the same sign and have the same general magnitudes and significance levels 
as those shown in the columns labeled Probit.  The same applies to tests of exogeneity for the other 
potentially suspect right hand side variables:  C.E.O. ownership, outside blockholder ownership and the 
bidder toehold level.15  Based upon these collective results I therefore focus my discussion on the results 
for the basic probit models reported in the columns labeled ‘Probit’.  
I also include in the models estimated the pre-bid run up of the target’s stock, computed as the 
daily cumulative market (F.T.S.E. All Share index) adjusted return over the 12 month period prior to the 
bid or prior to any official rumor period, whichever is longer.  Industry controls are also included but are 
not tabulated for brevity. Due to the sample size I identify each target with one of four industry sectors:  
natural resources, industrials, consumer goods, and services.  Dummy variables for industry sector 
membership are then constructed.  The dummy variables for industrials, consumer goods, and services are 
included in the model with the intercept absorbing the natural resources sector. 
                                                 
13 See Newey (1987) and Woolridge (2002). I use the pre-bid run-up of the target’s stock and the natural logarithm 
of target firm size as instrumental variables (see Betton,Eckbo and Thorburn (2010)). 
14 For the maximum likelihood estimation with a single continuous endogenous variable, the test is simply a Wald 
test that the correlation between the error terms in the structural equation and the reduced-form equation for the 
endogenous variable is equal to zero.  
15 Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Holderness (2009) I use the natural logarithm of target firm size and the 
standard deviation of daily target stock returns as instruments for these other potentially endogenous explanatory 
variables. 
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The probability of observing a resistance choice placing the target in the harmful resistance group 
increases with the size of the C.E.O.’s equity ownership interest.16  This result is consistent with the 
proposition that larger levels of managerial ownership can give rise to managers wielding more power 
and extracting greater private benefits of control as suggested by Demsetz (1983), Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Morck, Shleiffer and Vishny (1988) and Stulz (1988). This observation is plausible given the 
nature of my sample.  Unsolicited and resisted offers suggest that a negotiated deal may have already 
failed, or that the target’s management rejected any overtures from the bidder, both of which could be due 
to managers seeking to maintain their private benefits of control.  Broadly consistent with my findings are 
the results presented by Moeller (2005) who finds that higher C.E.O. stock ownership, in addition to other 
proxies for low target stockholder control, is associated with a smaller takeover premium.  One 
explanation for the result is that instead of negotiating a large takeover premium that would benefit 
shareholders, target C.E.O.s reach a side-deal with the bidder insuring they continue to receive private 
benefits which could come in the form of a generous severance package.  My results differ however from 
Walkling and Long (1984) and Cotter and Zenner (1994) who find that managers are more likely to reject 
bids the lower is their ownership stake.  My sample of managerial choices is different from these studies 
however in that I distinguish between harmful and non-harmful resistance which means I are not pooling 
all resistance actions together. 
Takeover bid resistance is non-linearly related to C.E.O. age.  Older managers use harmful 
opposition strategies with greater frequency, but this effect is partially mitigated for much older C.E.O.s.  
Neither the C.E.O. stock ownership nor age effects are affected by controlling for top managers who have 
only recently (within the 12 month period prior to bid announcement) become the top managers of target 
firms.  My findings for C.E.O. stock ownership and age echo those of Harford (2003) who documents that 
target C.E.O.s with a higher predicted probability of not being retained have a greater propensity to resist, 
                                                 
16 This result is not sensitive to using the logistic transformation of the percentage of shares held by the C.E.O. (not 
tabulated) employed in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villonga (2001). 
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rather than recommend, takeover bids.  Later I show that harmful resistance is associated with a higher 
probability of target C.E.O. turnover.  
The results consistently show that boards, excluding the C.E.O., that own more stock are less 
likely to endorse a harmful opposition strategy. 17  Results in the literature show that resisting boards tend 
to have lower ownership interests relative to those favoring takeover bids (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1988; Cotter and Zenner, 1994).  My results indicate that the level of board ownership discriminates 
between resistance driven by manager-driven motives in contrast to stockholder interests. 
 The estimation results for models (1) and (3) show that choices that place the target in the 
harmful resistance group are less probable when the board chair is independent and holds at least one 
other, non-interlocking, directorship.  This is the result I would expect if these chairpersons act as an 
important counterweight to the C.E.O. and whose reputations are potentially valuable.  The result is 
robust to the inclusion of a control identifying those firms that only initiated a dual leadership structure in 
the 12 months prior to being the target of a takeover.   
In model (5) the board leadership variable is replaced with the percentage of the board that are 
independent and that hold at least one other, non-interlocking, directorship.  The coefficient on this 
variable while negative is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  A significant shift in the 
corporate governance environment occurred in the U.K. during 1997-2003 including movement towards 
more outside director representation on boards.  I construct an interaction variable equal to the product of 
‘Independent directors (%)’ and a dummy variable that takes the value 1if the takeover bid occurred 
during the period 1989-1996 and (0) otherwise.   The coefficient of the interaction variable as reported 
under model (7) is negative and statistically significant.  The result indicates that board composition is an 
important factor but that its influence is restricted to the period 1989-96.   
There is no statistically significant association between target board size and harmful resistance.  
Using the natural logarithm of board size (not tabulated) does not alter this conclusion. Bange and 
                                                 
17 In contrast, Harford (2003) documents the potentially adverse impact of takeover bids on non-C.E.O.-directors’ 
(including outside directors’) wealth and future board seats. 
23 
 
Mazzeo (2004) find that targets with larger boards are more likely to receive unsolicited offers.  All the 
offers in my sample are unsolicited.  My result indicates that there is no marginal board size effect on 
resistance choice given an unsolicited offer. 
The marginal effect of the variable non-director-aligned blockholdings (‘outside blockholdings’) 
on the probability of resistance choices placing the firm in the harmful resistance group is negative and 
statistically significant.  This finding is robust to alternative measures of blockholdings, including a 
Herfindahl-type measure capturing block holding concentration (not tabulated).   The result is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the presence of blockholders discourages harmful resistance as suggested by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986 
The negative effects of the market to book and asset turnover ratios suggest that more efficient 
managers are less likely to resort to harmful resistance strategies and consequently less efficient managers 
more likely.  This relation is what I would predict if poorly performing managers fear disciplinary 
consequences and/or engage in the use of corporate resources that do not maximize value.  The results are 
robust to alternative time periods over which market to book and revenue to tangible assets ratios are 
computed.  The significant performance differences observed in Table 3 remain after netting out median 
industry effects (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).      
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) conclude that there is a greater propensity for poorer 
performing and older firms to be the targets of disciplinary takeover bids.  Also, consistent with this view, 
the results presented in Table 3 reveal that harmful resistance resistance is less likely for younger firms.  
Information about such firms is also likely to be less precise. Fishman (1988) argues that poor quality/ 
more costly information about target firms creates a bargaining imbalance, which I argue is more likely to 
induce the use of pro-stockholder resistance strategies.  Neither the differential effects related to past 
performance nor those emanating from the cost of information acquisition are affected by the inclusion of 
target firm size. 
The positive sign for the effect of the offer premium implies a greater likelihood of observing 
harmful opposition in response to higher initial bid premiums. One explanation for this result is that a 
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higher premium signals to target managers that the bidder is not only very serious about gaining control 
but also believes the target’s value can be enhanced, possibly through a reorganization of the target’s 
management team. In contrast, managers resorting to harmful opposition resist irrespective of the level of 
the premium. In contrast, the other targets have chosen to resist because the managers perceive that the 
initial offer premium undervalues their firm.Varying the target stock price used to estimate initial bid 
premiums does not lead to different inferences.   
Model (1) contains a control for bidder toehold.  The results suggest that toehold interests are not 
associated with the use of harmful resistance strategies.  However, I find that bidder toehold and outside 
blockholdings are highly positively correlated (43%) and the result is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level.  I estimate the model including bidder toehold but excluding outside blockholdings (not tabulated) 
and find that bidder toehold has a negative and statistically significant marginal effect.  I also substitute 
the factor identifying cases in the sample where initial bidders have representation on target boards, or are 
supported by dissident incumbent directors, for the toehold interest variable.  The result is a generally 
significant, negative effect for the variable.  Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) find that such a factor 
is significantly and inversely related to bid resistance in U.S. contests.  Initial bidders that have 
representatives, or the backing of dissidents, on target boards are less likely, therefore, to face harmful 
resistance.   
Finally, a cash only offer is not associated with the nature of bid resistance.  This is also true for 
cases in which the bidder approached the target before the public offer.  If target managers are intent on 
retaining their positions and control of the firm then they will resist whether the bidder has made takeover 
ovations prior to the public bid or not or whether the offer is for cash despite the potential positive aspects 
of a cash offer (see, Fishman, 1989; and the empirical results of Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993).  I treat the 
choice to offer cash as exogenous.  Theory and by and large all empirical studies of the choice to offer 
cash find that the choice is a function of bidder characteristics in contrast to target characteristics or 
behavior (Martin, 1996; Faccio and Masulis, 2005).   
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In summary, takeover bid resistance motivated by harmful resistance is more likely the greater 
are the personal stock interests of C.E.O.s, and as these top managers approach the peak of their executive 
careers (grow older).  Boards of directors that are more closely aligned with stockholders through equity 
ownership and/or are more independent of management are associated with a reduced propensity for 
harmful opposition.  Harmful resistance is also a less probable response the more concentrated are outside 
blockholdings, and the better performing are target firms.  Lower information quality about the target 
decreases the probability of harmful resistance while higher initial bid premiums increase its likelihood. 
Overall I consistently reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of each of the estimated 
models are equal to zero using a Wald test.   
 
5. Conditional expectations about the probability of bid success 
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that harmful defensive resistance is associated with 
weaknesses in managerial incentives and governance.  If the relations between resistance choice and 
incentives were simply a statistical artifact I would not expect the capital market to reflect the 
implications of such resistance in target stock price revisions at the time of the bid.  Simply looking at the 
market reaction by itself is insufficient to tease out the answer to this question.  One must account for the 
expected probability of success as well as the premium offered to assess whether capital market 
participants initially regard resistance choice as having a direct consequence.  I now provide such an 
examination. 
The capital market revaluation of the target at the time of the bid reflects both the offer premium 
as well as the market-wide assessment of the probability the bid will be successful.  In simple terms 
( ) ( )P Offer Pr emium x p∆ =  where p represents the assessed probability the offer will succeed and 
P∆  represents the change in the target’s share price when the offer is for all target shares, and the 
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expected price if the offer fails equals the pre-offer price.18  Of course in an empirical analysis P∆  must 
be suitably adjusted for general market movements.  A natural question is whether the probability of 
success assessed by the market at the time of the bid is different for firms in the harmful resistance group.   
I measure target share price reaction to a bid as the cumulative abnormal return (C.A.R.) over the 
period from 30 trading days prior to any bid rumor, or the formal announcement date if no rumor 
circulated, through the offer announcement date.  The market index used as a basis for the simple market 
model is the F.T.S.E. All Share Index.  The market model is estimated for each case using the 120 trading 
days leading up to 30 days prior to the first announcement or rumor date.  The mean and median target 
company C.A.R.s for the announcement interval equal 24% and 26% respectively and both are 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels of significance, consistent with most results 
reported in the literature (Franks and Harris, 1989; Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2010).   
I estimate the assessed probability of success by regressing target company C.A.R.s on the initial 
offer premium and several control variables that have been shown to be related to the response of target 
company share prices to bids (see for instance Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2010).  Table 4 reports the 
results.  I are interested in the estimated coefficient on the offer premium which reflects as noted earlier 
the market assessment of the probability of success.  I present estimates for the harmful resistance group 
of companies and separately for the remaining sample bids in columns (1) and (2) respectively, whereas 
column (3) reports results of a full interaction model based on a dummy variable defined by membership 
in the harmful resistance group. The estimated coefficients on the offer premium variable equal 0.422 for 
the harmful resistance group and 0.654 for all other targets.   These numbers represent the assessed 
probability of success for each group respectively.  Clearly the point estimates differ and suggest that the 
assessed probability of success is smaller (about 42%) for the harmful resistance subsample but 
nevertheless significantly different from zero.  In column (3) I present a full interaction model in which 
                                                 
18 See Cotter and Zenner (1994).  See also Asquith (1983), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983), Ruback (1988), and 
Fabozzi, Ferri, Fabozzi and Tucker (1988) for evidence that target company share prices in unsuccessful offers 
revert back to pre-offer levels.  . 
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the interaction dummy equals 1if the case belongs to the harmful resistance group and 0 otherwise.  The 
coefficient on the interaction variable defined as the dummy times the offer premium is negative (-0.232) 
and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The inference is therefore that the market’s assessment of 
the probability of success is significantly smaller for those cases in which resistance reflects harmful 
resistance.  Thus not only is harmful resistance fueled by weak governance, as shown in Table 3, but at 
the outset the market believes that such resistance reflects a lower probability the bid will be successful in 
imposing an opportunity cost on target shareholders.   I repeat the analysis using the estimated probability 
of harmful resistance for model (1) in Table 3.  A full interaction model akin to model (3) of Table 4 is 
estimated.  I find the results (not tabulated) are comparable to those presented in Table 4.   
How does the initial assessed market-based probability of success compare with actual success 
rates within the sample?  Takeover attempts ultimately leading to a complete change in control for the 
target firm are identified as bids that are ultimately declared unconditional in all respects.  This essentially 
means that the shareholders of the target company have agreed to sell to the bidder.  The overall success 
rate for the total sample is roughly 70%, but this proportion is only 60% for the harmful resistance group 
compared to 77% for the remaining targets.  If the market’s initial beliefs about the probability of success 
are conditioned on information available at the time of the initial bid, and nothing changes to alter those 
beliefs (that is, expected managerial actions and the market environment prove to be true on average), 
then the ultimate success rate should roughly equal the initial expected success rate.  The actual success 
rates for both groups suggests that other influences following the initial bid worked to increase the 
success rates for the two groups.  I find that these factors are the attraction of a third party offer and 
whether the final offer is for cash, both of which have a positive and statistically significant influence on 
the probability of success.  The average marginal effects on the probability of success (Z-statistics) for an 
estimated probit model of ultimate success (not tabulated) equal: third party offer, 0.368 (5.03); full cash 
offer, 0.305 (2.95).  In contrast the average marginal effect on success of resistance choice that places the 
target in the harmful resistance group is not significantly different from zero.  McFadden’s R2 for the 
model equals 0.22.  Thus while the market-wide initial belief is that resistance driven by harmful 
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resistance reduces the probability of success, subsequent actions of third party bidders raise the 
probability of success.   It is important however to remember that I are here referring to ultimate success 
rates and that 40% of those cases exhibiting harmful resistance ultimately fail.  
  
6. C.E.O. turnover and reputation 
 
Harmful resistance that destroys shareholder wealth is potentially an indicator of a more 
pervasive agency problem.  Hence it can be a reflection of potentially unobservable variables or forces 
that characterize managerial self-interest or entrenchment.  In this section I employ membership in the 
harmful resistance group as an indicator of a more deep-seated problem and explore whether the 
association between this indicator and events that arise subsequent to the takeover contests are consistent 
with the existence of such problems.    
In Table 5 I use resistance choice as a potential indicator of a more deep-seated problem, which 
may include an agency problem but may also capture managerial quality or ability.  Alternatively from 
the results presented in Table 3 I infer that the choice to adopt harmful resistance is associated with weak 
incentives and weak corporate governance.  The extant literature suggests that the strength of corporate 
governance and managerial incentives influence the disciplining of managers of poorly performing firms 
through turnover (Weisbach, 1988; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Volpin, 2002). Therefore if membership 
in the harmful resistance group captures the presence of more deep-seated value-related problems within 
the firm and if internal and external forces move to correct the problem following a takeover contest, then 
I should see adjustments in the employment positions of the C.E.O.’s involved.  I emphasize that I are 
using the classification variable here as an indicator or manifestation of managerial problems and as such 
I are not arguing that the resistance choice necessarily causes the changes in the employment 
opportunities of the C.E.O.’s in the sample.   I examine three outcome variables as pertain to target 
company C.E.O.’s.  The first is post-bid C.E.O. turnover.  Here a binary variable is used to identify cases 
where the C.E.O. either is turned over by the successful bidder (which can be a third party), or 
relinquishes office in the 12 months following a failed takeover attempt.   
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The general consensus in the literature is that weak performance is associated with C.E.O. 
turnover (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988; Martin and McConnell, 1991; 
Dahya, McConnell and Travlos, 2002; Kini, Kracaw and Mian, 2004; Kaplan and Minton, 2012).  I use 
the abnormal pre-bid run up in the target’s share price over the 1 year period ending 30 days before 
(rumor of) the bid.  Most studies of post-takeover target management turnover focus on successful offers. 
Agrawal and Walkling (1994) observe that target C.E.O.s are more likely to be replaced when a bid 
succeeds than when it fails.  My sample includes both successful and unsuccessful offers.  I therefore 
control for whether the bidder is successful.  The intuition being that if a takeover is completed (is 
successful) this provides the bidder with the opportunity to replace the target’s management.  I also 
include target size as a control variable as this is known to be correlated with numerous company 
characteristics.   
In my sample I find that of the 54 cases in which C.E.O. turnover occurred 46 of those were 
associated with successful takeovers.   
For all bids (completed or otherwise)  52% of the C.E.O.s represented in the harmful resistance 
group turn over compared to only 39% for the remaining targets.  Even for C.E.O.s who employ harmful 
resistance but are still acquired there remains a 37% chance of being retained.19    
The average marginal effects computed from a probit specification in which C.E.O. turnover is 
the dependent variable are presented in column (1) of Table 5.  C.E.O. turnover is positively related to 
membership in the harmful resistance group consistent with such actions on the part of managers 
revealing self-interest as well as weak incentives and governance.  This result suggests that turnover is 
associated with harmful resistance.  Turnover is negatively related to prior performance and is positively 
related to bid success.  The results on prior performance are consistent with those reported by others such 
as Martin and McConnell (1991) and Kini, Kracaw and Mian (2004) but suggest that managers that 
                                                 
19 Bates and Becher (2016) only focus on failed bids.  If I consider only the failed bids in my sample then the rate of 
C.E.O. turnover for the harmful resistance group (20 cases) is 35% compared to 6% for the remaining targets (16 
cases).  Furthermore, the market-adjusted returns from bid announcement through to 1 year post-bid (clean of any 
further bids) are -3.01% and 18.02% for the harmful resistance and remaining target groups, respectively.   
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exhibit behaviors suggestive of shareholder neglect are more likely to be replaced.  Harford (2003) also 
finds that a successful takeover attempt is one of the few important determinants in predicting the post-bid 
retention of inside directors.  All average marginal effects aside from target size are statistically 
significant.   
Moving from the position of a C.E.O. of a previously listed firm to a top manager of a subsidiary, 
or privately owned company, would likely not carry the same status or necessarily the same level of 
benefits, including control benefits.  If the managerial labor market and the market for directors penalize 
C.E.O.s following harmful resistance then I should expect there to be a low likelihood that such C.E.O.s 
will secure top executive or director positions following a takeover (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Harford, 
2003).  I therefore divide the sample cases according to whether target C.E.O.s serve as the top executive 
of a listed firm in any of the 2 years following either bid completion or the 12 month period after the 
failure of a takeover attempt.20  Seventy-two percent (72%) of the target C.E.O.s in the harmful resistance 
group do not continue to run listed firms after resisting takeover bids.  Interestingly the percentage is 
roughly the same for all other resisting targets in the sample. 
In a similar fashion, I also gather information on whether the C.E.O.s of the target companies in 
my sample go on to serve on the boards per se of listed companies  I find that 58% do not hold a director 
position following a takeover contest.  This percentage is also the same for the harmful resistance group 
and the other resisting targets. 21 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 present results for models of the post-bid probability that a target 
C.E.O. will not (binary dependent variable takes the value 1) serve as a top executive or director, 
respectively, of a listed company.  The explanatory variables are the same as those previously described 
                                                 
20 In which the eligible companies are members of a non-regulated industry (not in the financial/real estate, 
utility/telecommunication, public transport, broadcasting, and newspaper industries and have a full listing on the 
L.S.E.. 
 
21 If I consider only the failed bids in my sample then the rate of target C.E.O. attrition from the top executive 
positions of listed firms is 65% for the harmful resistance group compared to 38% for the remaining targets.  The 
attrition rates for post-bid directorships are 55% and 19% for the harmful resistance and remaining target groups, 
respectively.  
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for the model of C.E.O. turnover. The harmful resistance factor does not directly influence post-bid 
employment of a C.E.O. either as a top executive or as a director.  However, if the bid is successful the 
impact is to increase the C.E.O.s probability of not holding such positions.  Finally, C.E.O.s who are 
associated with larger targets face a decreased probability of not holding a position following a takeover.  
These results are statistically significant and are consistent with Harford (2003) who documents the 
potentially adverse impact of takeover bids on directors’ wealth and future board seats.    
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 drop the variable capturing whether the takeover bid is successful 
to instead investigate the relation between target C.E.O. turnover and their subsequent holding of a top 
executive position or a position as a director.  These results indicate that the probability of not holding 
such positions following a takeover contest increases if the C.E.O. leaves the target company.  The results 
are significant at approximately the 5% level for both cases.  Agrawal and Walkling (1994) also conclude 
that target C.E.O.s who lose their jobs generally fail to find another senior executive position within a 1-3 
year post-bid period.   
 
7. Conclusions 
The theoretical and empirical literature on takeovers is vast.  Yet surprisingly little is known 
about the motivations and drivers behind the multiplicity of actions taken by managers to resist takeover 
bids.  This paper attempts to address this deficiency by classifying resistance strategies according to 
whether they are harmful to stockholders.  A distinction between resistance motivated by managerial self-
interest/preservation and resistance motivated by shareholder wealth is fairly well grounded in the 
theoretical literature.  Empirically, however, studies have either treated resistance as a homogenous 
response or else focused in isolation on predominantly pre-emptive, anti-takeover measures.  In the spirit 
of Dann and DeAngelo (1988), I include all defensive asset restructuring and other blocking tactics in my 
harmful resistance group provided these actions elicit a negative return stock price reaction on 
announcement.  What I label as the harmful resistance group is then compared to the other resisting 
targets in my sample.  The overall sample of 121 resisted bids is drawn from the 1989-2003 period in the 
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U.K..  Conducting the study on U.K. resisted takeovers allows me to consistently capture managers’ 
responses to bids in the absence of pre-emptive, anti-takeover mechanisms, made ineffectual under the 
U.K. rules. 
My analysis reveals new insights, in particular, into the role of incentive and governance 
structures of resisting firms.  Firms in my sample resorting to harmful resistance strategies are found to 
have top managers with more pronounced ownership-based and age-related incentives for control, and 
other directors with equity interests less closely aligned to stockholders, as distinct from firms using 
resistance tactics designed to promote stockholder wealth.  Firms that follow harmful resistance strategies 
have less independent boards, are exposed to weaker discipline from active outside blockholders, and are 
inferior performers.  Prior studies have generally found no significant relation, or mixed results, when 
considering the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on either takeover resistance per 
se or the adoption of specific, anti-takeover measures.  Managers are also found to pursue harmful 
resistance strategies in the presence of higher initial offer premiums and greater information availability 
about their firms.  Previously it was known only that lower initial offer premiums were more likely to be 
resisted than recommended.  My observations on the nature of resistance are insensitive to an endogenous 
treatment of many of its determinants. 
Furthermore, I find that the likelihood of resistance being motivated more by managerial self-
interest is factored in adversely to announcement period returns as the capital market gauges its 
expectations of bids succeeding.  The completion rate for resisted bids in my sample is ultimately 
influenced by the emergence and solicitation of third party offers, which are more prevalent among the 
other resisting firms in the sample.  Finally, an incumbent C.E.O has a greater likelihood of being 
disciplined (turned over) when resisting for reasons that are harmful to shareholders.  C.E.O. turnover has 
in turn an overriding detrimental effect on the aftermarket, board employment of these incumbent 
managers.  Previous studies have not documented an effect of takeover resistance in general on C.E.O. 
turnover that is incremental to pre-bid performance.          
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The continued relevance of the ongoing academic debate on takeover resistance is starkly 
illustrated by the controversy that persisted in the European Union until member states reached less than 
harmonious agreement on the extent to which anti-takeover mechanisms and bid resistance tactics should 
be controlled through the European Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC).  My study of the potential drivers 
and effects of resistance motivated by harmful resistance gives credence to those on both sides of the 
Atlantic who favour constraints on managerial actions driven by bad faith as distinct from those that 
legitimately enhance bargaining power on behalf of stockholders.     
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Table 1 
Resistance tactics. 
Percentage of targets using specific resistance tactics and initiating a pre-bid corporate restructuring from a sample of 121 publicly resisted U.K. 
takeover bids from the period 1989-2003.  Panel A is for the subsample of 50 resisted U.K. takeover bids classified as members of the harmful resistance 
group.  Panel B is for the full sample of 121 U.K. takeover bids.  Membership in the harmful resistance group of resisting targets is defined by a target 
experiencing a negative share price reaction at the announcement of the resistance action for each of the tactics listed.  Resistance tactics: (1) Spin-
offs/sell-offs which are divestments that deny bidders access to assets of value; (2) Mergers/acquisitions/joint ventures which make target firms more 
cumbersome to acquire due to size, strategic or antitrust grounds, or which eliminate bidders directly; (3) Stock repurchases/special dividends which 
involve payouts that effectively eliminate bidders’ plans for the utilization of excess cash held by the target, and, in the case of targeted repurchases, that 
increase the proportion of stock in the hands of friendly stockholders; (4) Going private transactions which use competing management buyouts to create 
potentially costly bidding contests; (5) Management changes which make removal of newly appointed officers especially costly because of special 
contractual payments (‘golden parachutes’) triggered by a takeover; and (6) White squires which involve solicitation of friendly third party participants 
who acquire a stake that will effectively block the takeover.  Market-adjusted returns at announcement of the resistance actions use the F.T.S.E All Share 
index as the market proxy.  Third party offer solicitation is direct solicitation of a third party takeover attempt by the incumbent board.  Credibly higher 
profit and dividend forecasts are profit and dividend reports released by the target board with at least a 10 percent improvement on the last financial 
period.  Pre-bid asset restructuring and management change are an asset restructuring and management change initiated by the incumbent board in the 
year before either commencement of formal bid proceedings or any associated rumour of an impending takeover attempt.  **, * indicates significance at 
the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
(Table continued on following page). 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel A: Subsample of 50 resisted U.K. takeover bids classified as members of the harmful resistance group. 
 
 
Resistance tactic 
 
 
 
1989-2003 
(50 bids) 
(1) 
 
Average 
market- 
adjusted return 
at 
announcement 
of action (%) 
(2) 
 
 
% of market-
adjusted returns 
that are <0 
(3) 
 
 
 
1989-1996 
(24 bids) 
(4) 
 
 
 
1997-2003 
(26 bids) 
(5) 
Spin-off/sell-off 46.0% -2.72 100 58.3% 34.6% 
Merger/acquisition/joint venture 30.0% -3.46 100 25.0% 34.6% 
Stock repurchase/special dividend 16.0% -1.24 100 8.3% 23.1% 
Going-private transaction 10.0% -1.36 100 4.2% 15.4% 
Management change 10.0% -0.77 100 12.5% 7.7% 
White squire 8.0% -1.37 100 8.3% 7.7% 
Panel B: Full sample of 121 resisted U.K. takeover bids. 
 
 
Resistance tactic and pre-bid 
corporate restructuring 
 
Harmful 
resistance 
group  
(50 bids) 
(1) 
All other 
resisting 
targets 
(71 bids) 
(2) 
1989-2003 
(121 bids) 
(3) 
1989-1996 
(bids)  
(4) 
 
1997-2003 
(bids)  
(5) 
  
(1) – (2) 
(6) 
(4) – (5) 
(7) 
Third party offer solicitation 46.0% 46.0% 46.0% 46.0% 46.0%   
Credibly higher profit forecast   30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0%   
Credibly higher dividend forecast   16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%   
Pre-bid asset restructuring 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%   
Pre-bid management change 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%   
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics for target firm and initial offer characteristics by resistance strategy for a sample of 121 publicly resisted U.K. takeover bids 1989-2003.  Membership in the 
harmful resistance group is as described in Table 1.  Target/initial offer characteristics: C.E.O. ownership (%) is the percentage of outstanding equity at the bid announcement date 
in which the most influential target officer (based on title, and, if no officer carries the title ‘Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O.)’, on compensation) has a beneficial interest.  C.E.O. 
age is the age of the target C.E.O. at bid announcement.  Other directors’ ownership (%) is the percentage of outstanding equity at the bid announcement date in which target 
directors other than the C.E.O. have a (non-duplicated) beneficial interest.  Independent chairperson (=1) is a binary variable equal to one if the director serving as target chairperson 
at the bid announcement date is non-aligned (no personal, employment, or business connections to affect their oversight) and holds at least one other directorship, that is non-
interlocking (I permit the non-aligned chairperson to serve as an executive director elsewhere provided the target C.E.O. is not on the same board), in a fully listed firm outside the 
financial/real estate, utility/telecommunication, public transport, broadcasting, and newspaper industries.  Independent directors (%) is the proportion of independent (as described 
for Independent chairperson) target board members (including the C.E.O.) at the bid announcement date.  Board size is the number of target firm directors (including the C.E.O.) at 
the bid announcement date.  Outside blockholdings (%) is the percentage sum of non-aligned (as described for Independent chairperson) stock interests wielding at least 5% of total 
target equity votes (excluding initial bidder toeholds) at the bid announcement date.  Offer premium is the percentage difference between the unit initial offer value (using the 
bidder’s stock price 5 trading days before the bid announcement date for offers involving an exchange of common stock) and the target firm’s stock price (adjusted for rumor as per 
the Valuation ratio described below).  Bidder toehold (%) is the percentage of total target equity votes controlled by the initial bidder and any connected parties immediately prior to 
offer announcement.  Bidder/dissident director (=1) is a binary variable equal to one if the initial bidder has a representative on the target board, or a dissident target director pledges 
support for this bidder.  Full cash terms (=1) is a binary variable equal to one if the initial bid offers full cash terms (including a full cash alternative to the main terms).  Bidder 
approach (=1) is a binary variable equal to one if the initial bidder makes a genuine approach to the target board before launching their bid.  Valuation ratio is the average market to 
tangible book value of assets (where market value of assets is the common stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding shares plus the book value of non-equity securities 
and total debt, and the denominator is total assets minus intangibles) of the target firm for the two financial years preceding the bid announcement date (adjusting the more recent 
market value of equity to just before an unofficial rumor period of 30 trading days plus any official rumor period).  Asset turnover is the average sales to tangible assets ratio of the 
target firm for the two financial years preceding the bid announcement date.  Young firm (=1) is a binary variable equal to one if the target firm has been fully listed for 6 years or 
less at the bid announcement date.  Sample size is determined by data availability.   **, * indicates significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.   
(Table continued on following page). 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Target/initial offer 
characteristics 
    
Targets in the harmful resistance 
group 
 
All other resisting targets 
 
Difference  
Mean 
(1) 
Media 
(2) 
Proportion of 
targets/offers 
(3) 
Mean 
(4) 
Median 
(5) 
Proportion of 
targets/offers 
(6) 
 
 
t-stat. for 
mean diff. 
(7) 
Kruskal-
Wallis 2χ  
med. diff. 
(8) 
 
 
Z-stat. for 
prop. diff. 
(9) 
 
 
Sample 
size 
(10) 
C.E.O. ownership (%) 2.30 0.09  1.47 0.14   0.83 -0.03  121 
C.E.O. age 52.02 53.00  51.24 51.00   0.86 -0.78  120 
Other directors’ ownership (%) 1.24 0.30  2.89 0.44  -1.62 -0.67  121 
Independent chairperson (=1)   0.20   0.45   -2.85** 121 
Independent directors (%) 16.61 16.67  18.74 16.67  -0.78 -0.71  121 
Board size 7.18 7.00  7.10 7.00  0.19 0.00  121 
Outside blockholdings (%) 25.05 24.50  32.23 33.00  -1.99* -3.97*  121 
Offer premium (%) 39.34 31.47  30.89 28.04  1.07 -0.36  120 
Bidder toehold (%)  11.52 1.00  15.23 5.00  -1.19 -1.09  121 
Bidder/dissident director (=1)    0.06   0.17   -1.79 121 
Full cash terms (=1)   0.62   0.75   -1.49 121 
Bidder approach (=1)   0.34   0.25    1.03 121 
Valuation ratio 1.27 1.17  1.33 1.18  -0.69 -0.12  115 
Asset turnover 1.29 1.20  1.46 1.43  -0.96 -1.71  115 
Young firm (=1)    0.06   0.24   -2.62** 121 
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Table 3 
Resistance choice. 
Average marginal effects of explanatory variables on the probability of target board resistance reflecting harmful resistance for a sample of 121 publicly resisted U.K. 
takeover bids 1989-2003.  Absolute values of z-statistics are presented (in parentheses) for tests of the null hypothesis that the average marginal effect is equal to zero and are 
computed using robust standard errors.  Base model from which the marginal effects are computed is a probit specification in which the dependent variable takes the value 1 if 
the target belongs to the harmful resistance group and 0 otherwise.  Columns labeled Probit treat Offer premium as exogenous by assumption.  Columns labeled 2-Stage treat 
Offer premium as endogenous and present Wald tests statistics of the null hypothesis that Offer premium is exogenous.  Pre-bid run-up of the target’s stock (described below) 
and the natural logarithm of target firm size (market value of assets of the target firm for the financial year preceding the bid announcement date, where market value of assets 
is the common stock price, adjusted to just before an unofficial rumor period of 30 trading days plus any official rumor period, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares 
plus the book value of non-equity securities and total debt).  P-values > 0.05 indicate the null of exogeneity is not rejected at that level.  2-stage model estimated by maximum 
likelihood methods.  Wald test of model statistics test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the model are jointly equal to zero.  Refer to Table 1 for definitions 
of target board resistance reflecting harmful resistance and to Table 2 for definitions of variables.  Pre-bid run-up (%) is the daily cumulative market (F.T.S.E. All Share 
index) adjusted target stock return over the 12 month period ending 30 trading days either prior to the earliest release concerning a bid rumor, or the initial offer 
announcement if there is no formal disclosure anticipating a takeover attempt.  1989-1996 bid (=1) takes the value 1 if the initial bid is publicly resisted during the period 
1989-1996 and 0 otherwise.  Sample size is determined by data availability.  **, * indicates significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.   
(Table continued on following page). 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Dependent variable:  Targets in the harmful resistance group =  1, otherwise = 0 
 Probit (1) 
2-Stage 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
2-Stage 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
2-Stage 
(6) 
Probit 
(7) 
2-Stage 
(8) 
         
C.E.O. ownership (%) 0.044 0.035 0.042 0.030 0.041 0.030 0.036 0.027 
 (4.66)** (2.88)** (4.13)** (2.89)** (4.12)** (2.81)** (4.07)** (2.92)** 
C.E.O. age 0.239 0.226 0.212 0.206 0.225 0.216 0.227 0.219 
 (2.63)** (2.51)* (2.29)* (2.28)* (2.42)* (2.39)* (2.53)* (2.51)* 
(C.E.O. age)2 -0.022 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 
 (2.47)* (2.34)* (2.17)* (2.14)* (2.29)* (2.24)* (2.41)* (2.36)* 
Other directors' own (%) -0.078 -0.082 -0.076 -0.083 -0.076 -0.081 -0.078 -0.084 
 (4.39)** (4.83)** (3.96)** (4.56)** (4.26)** (4.72)** (4.39)** (4.69)** 
Ind. chair (=1) -0.240 -0.248 -0.204 -0.217     
 (2.84)** (2.92)** (2.68)** (2.77)**     
Board size -0.025 -0.023 -0.026 -0.026 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 
 (1.25) (1.17) (1.43) (1.39) (1.28) (1.21) (1.33) (1.32) 
Outside blockholdings (%) -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
 (2.92)** (2.97)** (3.41)** (3.63)** (3.84)** (3.87)** (2.95)** (2.94)** 
Valuation ratio -0.141 -0.164 -0.170 -0.208 -0.172 -0.206 -0.160 -0.192 
 (1.83) (2.12)* (2.11)* (2.56)* (2.02)* (2.42)* (2.13)* (2.42)* 
Asset turnover -0.165 -0.155 -0.170 -0.162 -0.170 -0.161 -0.181 -0.171 
 (3.37)** (3.17)** (3.24)** (3.36)** (3.55)** (3.50)** (3.84)** (3.79)** 
Young firm (=1) -0.546 -0.510 -0.509 -0.468 -0.515 -0.479 -0.507 -0.473 
 (5.04)** (3.95)** (5.46)** (4.48)** (5.34)** (4.50)** (5.81)** (5.15)** 
Offer premium (%) 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (3.41)** (2.31)* (3.09)** (2.27)* (3.10)** (2.29)* (2.64)** (2.09)* 
Bidder toehold (%) -0.004 -0.004       
 (1.54) (1.36)       
Full cash terms (=1) -0.193 -0.194 -0.159 -0.162 -0.157 -0.158 -0.131 -0.125 
 (2.20)* (2.22)* (1.87) (1.88) (1.81) (1.80) (1.65) (1.56) 
Bidder approach (=1) 0.095 0.107 0.076 0.095 0.093 0.109 0.099 0.112 
 (1.00) (1.11) (0.87) (1.07) (1.05) (1.23) (1.17) (1.32) 
Pre-bid run-up (%) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.20) (0.91) (1.34) (1.17) (1.66) (1.45) (1.42) (1.35) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Dependent variable:  Targets in the harmful resistance group =  1, otherwise = 0 
 Probit (1) 
2-Stage 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
2-Stage 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
2-Stage 
(6) 
Probit 
(7) 
2-Stage 
(8) 
         
1989-1996 bid. (=1) -0.304 -0.304 -0.283 -0.290 -0.307 -0.308   
 (3.66)** (3.77)** (3.19)** (3.49)** (3.54)** (3.65)**   
Bidder/dissident dir. (=1)   -0.224 -0.240 -0.238 -0.256 -0.285 -0.302 
   (1.94) (1.97)* (1.98)* (2.03)* (2.55)* (2.63)** 
Independent directors (%)     -0.005 -0.005   
     (1.60) (1.51)   
Ind. dir (%) x 1989-1996 
bid (=1) 
      -0.012 -0.012 
       (2.99)** (3.07)** 
McFadden's R2 0.38  0.39  0.37  0.37  
Wald test of model 39.58 41.02 37.22 40.25 41.72 40.13 41.18 38.62 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Observations 114 113 114 113 114 113 114 113 
Wald test for exogeneity 
of Offer premium 
 1.26  1.36  1.16  0.40 
p-value  0.26  0.24  0.28  0.53 
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Table 4 
Market assessment of the probability of bid success.   
Linear regressions of announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (C.A.R.s) for a sample of 121 publicly resisted U.K. takeover bids from the period 1989-
2003.  Announcement period C.A.R.s (in %) are computed as daily cumulative abnormal (F.T.S.E. All Share index adjusted) target stock returns over the period 
from 30 trading days before bid rumor, or formal announcement if no prior 12 month rumor related disclosure, through to the initial offer announcement date.  
Harmful resistance is a binary variable equal to one if the target is classified as described in Table 1 and 0 otherwise.  Target size (ln) is as defined in Table 3.  Offer 
premium (%), bidder toehold (%) and Full cash terms (=1) are as defined in Table 2.  Sample size is determined by data availability.  T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are computed using robust standard errors.  **, * indicates significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  Assessed probability the offer will be 
successful is shown in bold 
 Dependent variable: 
Target company announcement period CARs 
 
Harmful 
resistance group 
(1) 
All others 
 
(2) 
Full interaction 
model 
(3) 
Offer premium (%) 0.422 0.654 0.654 
 (9.83)** (13.23)** (12.48)** 
Bidder toehold (%) -0.394 -0.234 -0.234 
 (2.88)** (2.75)** (2.59)* 
Full cash terms (=1) 16.464 3.973 3.973 
 (3.97)** (1.14) (1.08) 
Target size (ln) 3.438 1.145 1.145 
 (2.91)** (1.17) (1.11) 
Harmful resistance (=1)   -47.263 
   (1.53) 
Harmful resistance (=1) x Off. Premium (%)   -0.232 
   (3.52)** 
Harmful resistance (=1) x Bidder toehold (%)   -0.161 
   (1.03) 
Harmful resistance (=1) x Full cash terms (=1)   12.491 
   (2.35)* 
Harmful resistance (=1) x Target size (ln)   2.293 
   (1.52) 
Constant -65.925 -18.662 -18.662 
 (2.69)** (0.94) (0.89) 
Adj. R-squared 0.74 0.76 0.75 
F-statistic 34.73 54.36 39.49 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 49 70 119 
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Table 5  
Post-bid C.E.O. outcomes. 
Average marginal effects of explanatory variables on the probability of (1) Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O.) turnover, 
(2) C.E.O. non-retention of a position as a top executive at the target or another firm, and (3) C.E.O. non-retention of a 
position as a director at the target firm or another firm.  C.E.O. turnover is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the 
target C.E.O. either is turned over by the successful bidder, or relinquishes office in the 12 months following a failed 
takeover attempt, and 0 otherwise.  C.E.O. non-retention of a top executive position is a binary variable that takes the 
value 1 if the target C.E.O. does not go on to be a top executive of a fully listed firm (outside the financial/real estate, 
utility/telecommunication, public transport, broadcasting, and newspaper industries) in any of the 2 years following 
either bid completion or the 12 month period after the failure of a takeover attempt, and 0 otherwise.  C.E.O. non-
retention of a director position is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the target C.E.O. does not go on to be a 
director of a fully listed firm (from a non-regulated industry as defined above) in any of the 2 years following either bid 
completion or the 12 month period after the failure of a takeover attempt, and 0 otherwise.  The sample is composed of 
121 publicly resisted U.K. takeover bids from the period 1989-2003.  Absolute values of z-statistics are presented (in 
parentheses) for tests of the null hypothesis that the average marginal effect is equal to zero and are computed using 
robust standard errors.  Base model from which marginal effects are computed is a probit specification in which the 
dependent variable takes the value 1 or 0 as described above.  Harmful resistance (=1) is as defined in Table 1.  Pre-bid 
run-up (%) and Target size (ln) are as defined in Table 3.  Bid successful (=1) is a binary variable equal to one if the 
prevailing bid (that can be from a third party) is ultimately declared unconditional in all respects.  Sample size is 
determined by data availability.  **, * indicates significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
 
C.E.O. 
turnover 
(1) 
C.E.O. 
without 
post-bid top 
executive 
position 
(2) 
C.E.O. 
without 
post-bid 
directorship 
(3) 
C.E.O. 
without 
post-bid top 
executive 
position 
(4) 
C.E.O. 
without 
post-bid 
directorship 
(5) 
      
Harmful resistance (=1) 0.204 0.085 0.127 0.016 0.051 
 (2.22)* (0.95) (1.42) (0.21) (0.61) 
      
Pre-bid run-up (%) -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.55)* (1.03) (0.82) (1.02) (0.81) 
      
Bid successful (=1) 0.339 0.275 0.272   
 (3.74)** (3.01)** (3.11)**   
      
Target size (ln) 0.021 -0.063 -0.114 -0.061 -0.109 
 (0.74) (2.80)** (5.71)** (2.94)** (5.41)** 
      
C.E.O. turnover (=1)    0.160 0.161 
    (2.03)* (1.95) 
      
McFadden's R2 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.09 0.15 
Wald test 20.64 16.07 26.82 13.69 22.29 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
 
 
 
